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It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super 
Precedent: A Response to Farber and 
Gerhardt 
Randy E. Barnett† 
In recent years, as the popularity of originalist interpreta-
tion has risen from the ashes of its supposed demise in the 
1980s,1 its critics have increasingly harped on its supposed in-
compatibility with the doctrine of stare decisis. Or perhaps 
more accurately, they have asserted stare decisis to defend 
their favorite cases and doctrines from originalist critiques. In 
some measure, this response has been effective because 
originalists themselves are divided on the role of precedent vis-
a-vis originalism.2 
Some originalists—let us call them “faint-hearted original-
ists,” which is how Justice Scalia describes himself3—base their 
originalism in important part on “the rule of law” with its re-
sultant predictability and stability, upon which stare decisis 
 
†  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. E-mail: rbarnett@gmail.com. My thanks to Scott Scheule for his edit-
ing and research assistance. 
 1. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. 
REV. 611, 611–29 (1999) (describing the rise of the “New Originalism”); see 
also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1124–48 (2003) (dis-
cussing the contributions to this development played by Robert Bork, Steven 
Calabresi, Frank Easterbrook, Gary Lawson, John Manning, Michael McCon-
nell, Michael Paulsen, Saikrishna Prakash, Antonin Scalia, Guy Seidman, and 
others). 
 2. See Symposium, Stare Decisis, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 
Apr. 2006). 
 3. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 
849, 864 (1989) (“I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-
hearted originalist.”). On the basis of his writings and judicial decisions, I re-
luctantly conclude that Justice Scalia is not really an originalist. See Randy E. 
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism, 75 U. 
CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2006).  
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also seems to be based. Perhaps most importantly, a commit-
ment to some degree of stare decisis allows faint-hearted 
originalists to plead nolo contendere with certain precedents 
that they would rather not challenge because to do so would be 
political suicide. Or so they think. Of course, it is also possible 
that some originalists simply prefer the results of certain 
precedents over the original meaning of the Constitution that 
these cases have supplanted, and they are looking for a limita-
tion on their professed commitment to originalism. 
Other originalists like Mike Paulsen,4 Gary Lawson,5 and 
myself6—call us “fearless originalists,” perhaps because we will 
never personally have to fear Senate confirmation hearings—
reject the doctrine of stare decisis in the following sense: if a 
prior decision of the Supreme Court is in conflict with the 
original meaning of the text of the Constitution, it is the Con-
stitution and not precedent that binds present and future Jus-
tices. The reason why fearless originalists reject stare decisis 
can be summarized by the following syllogism: 
(1) Originalism amounts to the claim that the meaning of 
the Constitution should remain the same until it is properly 
changed. 
(2)  None of the three branches of government on which the 
written Constitution imposes limits should be able to alter 
these limitations, either alone or in concert, without properly 
amending the Constitution in writing. 
(3) For this reason, the Supreme Court cannot change the 
Constitution which it is sworn to uphold and enforce. 
(4) Were the Court mistakenly to decide a case that adopts 
an interpretation that contradicts the original meaning of the 
text, and this mistake became entrenched by the doctrine of 
precedent, then the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the text 
would trump its original meaning. 
(5)  In this manner, the doctrine of stare decisis is inconsis-
tent with originalism. 
 
 4. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influ-
ence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr. 2006). 
 5. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994). 
 6. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Mean-
ing: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr. 
2006); available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/ 
BarnettR050205.pdf. The argument I make there is summarized in the next 
few paragraphs. 
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The normative case for originalism is based, in large meas-
ure, on the superiority of the enacted text over the opinions of 
members of the government whom it is supposed to govern and 
limit—including members of the Supreme Court.7 I do not see 
how an originalist can accept that the Supreme Court could 
change the meaning of the text from what it meant as enacted 
and still remain an originalist. In other words, once it becomes 
appropriate for the Supreme Court to discard original meaning 
and the original meaning of the text is thereby reduced to a fac-
tor among many considerations by which the Constitution is 
“interpreted,” the method being used is no longer originalism. 
I suppose we can say that faint-hearted originalists refuse 
to ignore original meaning completely, as some nonoriginalists 
are willing to do. But whether they are willing to follow it or 
discard it is being determined by other nonoriginalist princi-
ples—such as the need for stability and predictability—an ap-
proach with which many nonoriginalists would be entirely com-
fortable. Indeed, it is fashionable these days for nonoriginalists 
to include some role for history in their methods of interpreta-
tion,8 as a starting point, as a factor to be combined with other 
“modalities,”9 or as meaning that must be “translated” into 
modern content.10 It becomes quite difficult to distinguish these 
nonoriginalists from faint-hearted originalists. 
The rejection by fearless originalists of stare decisis when 
it conflicts with original meaning is not, I hasten to add, a re-
jection of all use of precedent. Elsewhere, I describe several im-
portant roles for precedent within fearless originalism.11 Deci-
sions reached by the Court in prior cases (1) can be followed in 
nonconstitutional cases, which make up the bulk of what the 
Supreme Court decides; (2) can provide constitutional construc- 
 
 
 7. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRE-
SUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–117 (2004) (expanding the normative argument for 
originalism beyond that presented above and in Barnett, supra note 1). 
 8. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 1344 (1997) (“In recent years, the originalist premise 
has also been manifested in the emerging strain of broad originalism in liberal 
and progressive constitutional theory.”). 
 9. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–14 
(1991) (counting both “historical” and “textual” as useful and legitimate “mo-
dalities” of constitutional argument). 
 10. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1365, 1367–68 (1997) (defending his “translation” theory). 
 11. See Barnett, supra note 6. 
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tions that are often needed to apply the provisions of the text to 
actual cases and controversies; (3) can generate reliance claims 
by particular individuals upon unconstitutional governmental 
actions that the Court has previously permitted; (4) can provide 
epistemic guidance in the face of uncertain original meaning; 
and (5) can perhaps also be used to resolve latent ambiguities 
in the text by “fixing” its meaning until the Constitution is for-
mally amended.12 
I will not repeat here my explanation of each of these po-
tentially proper uses of precedent within a theory of original-
ism, and mention them now solely to emphasize that even a 
fearless commitment to originalism does not forgo all uses of 
precedent. It is fearless only in the sense that it acknowledges 
that Supreme Court decisions can never trump the clear origi-
nal meaning of the text—a proposition denied by nonoriginal-
ists. In this regard, although evolving constitutional law may 
well share some of the qualities of a common-law system, this 
body of judicially-developed doctrine is “bounded” by a text that 
it cannot supersede, in the very same manner that statutes are 
traditionally thought to trump common-law judicial decisions. 
I.  POSITING SUPER PRECEDENT 
In his Essay in this symposium, Dan Farber extols the vir-
tues of precedent,13 many of which have led some self-described 
originalists to the faint-hearted school. Among the virtues he 
lists are (1) efficiency, by which he means saving time and 
trouble,14 (2) humility,15 (3) stability,16 (4) uniformity or equal-
ity, in the sense of treating like cases alike,17 (5) the ability of  
 
 
 12. I am myself uncertain about the last of these five uses of precedent, 
but list it here in the interest of completeness. 
 13. See Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1173 (2006). 
 14. Id. at 1177 (“One of these universal justifications is efficiency: it saves 
time and trouble to rely on earlier decisions.”). 
 15. Id. at 1178 (“A second reason is humility. It would be arrogant to as-
sume that we alone have access to wisdom.”). 
 16. Id. at 1177 (“It is simply unworkable to leave everything up for grabs 
all of the time.”). 
 17. Id. at 1179 (“It seems arbitrary for a case to be decided one way this 
year, perhaps leading to a prisoner’s execution or other serious consequences, 
and for an identical case to be decided the opposite way next year simply be-
cause of a change in judicial personnel.”). 
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courts to provide guidance in the future,18 and (6) its tendency 
towards neutral principles.19 
With all this going for the doctrine of stare decisis, one al-
most expects Farber to contend that precedent should never be 
reversed. But of course he is far too realistic and pragmatic for 
that. We all know that precedents are reversible under the 
right set of circumstances, and even under the wrong. The 
sixty-four thousand dollar question for the voluminous juris-
prudence of precedent is identifying exactly when to adhere 
and when to reverse. I cannot survey this literature here. Suf-
fice to say that, despite these well-known advantages of prece-
dent so ably summarized by Farber, everyone favors reversing 
precedent sometimes. 
In his Essay, Farber never identifies the circumstances in 
which precedent should be reversed—which I think is a major 
weakness of any serious treatment of the doctrine of stare de-
cisis. But he does suggest which precedents should not be re-
versed. He calls these “bedrock precedents,”20 but we may also 
refer to them, like Michael Gerhardt and Senator Arlen Spec-
ter, as “super precedent.”21 Here is how Farber describes these 
very special precedents: 
  At least in certain kinds of cases, precedent gains added impor-
tance in the constitutional area. One purpose of having a written con-
stitution is to create a stable framework for government. This goal 
would be undermined if the Court failed to give special credence to 
bedrock precedents—precedents that have become the foundation for 
large areas of important doctrine. Some obvious examples involve the 
rulings of the New Deal era upholding the validity of the Social Secu-
rity system and other federal taxing and spending programs, and 
those recognizing federal jurisdiction over the economy. These ome- 
 
 
 18. Id. at 1179 (“[O]nly by following the reasoning of previous decisions 
can the courts provide guidance for the future, rather than a series of uncon-
nected outcomes in particular cases.”). 
 19. Id. (“[T]he judge is pushed to a form of neutrality—not the neutrality 
of being value-free, but the neutrality of articulating standards that one is 
willing to live with in the future.”). 
 20. Id. passim. 
 21. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 passim 
(2006); Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 30, 2005, § 4, at 1 (“The term superprecedents first surfaced at the Su-
preme Court confirmation hearings of Judge John Roberts, when Senator 
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 
asked him whether he agreed that certain cases like Roe had become super-
precedents or ‘super-duper’ precedents—that is, that they were so deeply em-
bedded in the fabric of law they should be especially hard to overturn.”). 
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lettes cannot be unscrambled today, as even some devoted believers in 
originalism acknowledge. Likewise, it is far too late in the day to in-
validate independent agencies, as some originalists would like, or to 
undo the twentieth century rulings that “incorporated” the Bill of 
Rights and made it applicable to the states, or to reconsider the con-
stitutionality of segregation.22 
It is not just that overruling these precedents would be 
“imprudent.”23 Farber further claims that, “in an important 
sense, it would run against the purposes of constitutionalism. 
Overruling these doctrines would create just the kind of uncer-
tainty and instability that constitutions (even more than other 
laws) are designed to avoid . . . .”24 
Moreover, he claims, “Legitimate or not, these modern con-
stitutional doctrines are here to stay as a realistic matter.”25 By 
this he means something more than “might makes right.” 
Rather, these super precedents are somehow “constitutional” in 
a way that even parts of the written Constitution are not: 
Plenary federal power over fiscal and economic matters, independent 
agencies, and application of the Bill of Rights to the states are now in-
tegral parts of our system of government; in some ways, they are more 
“constitutional” than some of the more obscure parts of the written 
Constitution.26 
One possible “pragmatic” approach to “omelettes [that] 
cannot be unscrambled”27 would be simply to refuse to revisit 
decisions justifying existing institutions and to consider these 
particular decisions to be settled by means of something like a 
constitutional “grandfather clause.” Like criminal convictions, 
existing government institutions and programs under this ap-
proach to precedent would not be declared unconstitutional af-
ter the fact. But the decisions by which they were upheld 
would, if found to conflict with the original meaning of the text, 
lose what Dworkin refers to as their “gravitational force.”28 
“This far but no farther” could be the gradualist way to reestab-
lish the original meaning of the text as constitutional law.29 
 
 
 22. Farber, supra note 13, at 1180 (footnotes omitted). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1180–81.  
 25. Id. at 1181. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. at 1180. 
 28. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 121 (1997); Ronald 
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1089 (1975). 
 29. To be clear, I am not endorsing this gradualist approach, but simply 
identifying it as a possible response to the concern about overly rapid change. 
BARNETT_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:08:26 AM 
1238 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1232 
 
But Farber claims more for these super precedents than a 
gradualist approach to changes in constitutional law would 
provide. 
[T]his is an untenable stance in a legal system that seeks some form 
of coherence. . . .  
  A sensible legal system can tolerate having a few small patches of 
doctrine retained because of practical imperatives but rejected in 
principle. But a legal system in which huge swathes of the law are 
considered unprincipled, while small corners are governed by princi-
ple, makes no sense at all. Bedrock rulings cannot be “limited to their 
facts” if the legal system is to have any claim to integrity; rather, they 
must be given generative force as precedents.30 
So these bedrock principles are pretty super indeed. They 
not only cannot be reversed, but they must be extended into the 
indefinite future. As Farber explains: 
  Adherence to precedent does not mean simply refusing to overrule 
past decisions—it means taking them seriously as starting points for 
analysis in future cases. This notion derives partly from reasoning by 
analogy based on similarities between the facts of cases, but more im-
portantly, it reflects a need to give credence to the reasoning in ear-
lier opinions.31 
Wow. Whatever happened to the “living constitution”? 
II.  TWO FALLACIES OF SUPER PRECEDENT 
Given the enormous potential practical and legal import of 
adopting a concept of super precedents, two obvious questions 
arise. What justifies super precedents trumping the original 
meaning of the text of the Constitution? How do we tell which 
precedents are super precedents? Given that Professor Farber 
is a pragmatist who has coauthored a wonderfully engaging 
book about the “misguided quest for constitutional founda-
tions,”32 we should not really expect a theoretical answer to ei-
ther of these questions. And in this regard, we are not disap-
pointed. 
Although Farber’s Essay begins with the aforementioned 
paean to the six benefits of precedent, these benefits attach to 
the ordinary reversible precedents as well as to bedrock or su-
per precedents. In other words, these benefits argue for a re-
spect for precedents generally. They do not tell us when prece-
 
 30. Farber, supra note 13 at 1183 (footnotes omitted). 
 31. Id.  
 32. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING 
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
(2002). 
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dents can be overruled, as everyone concedes sometimes can 
and should be done. Nor does a list of these benefits help us 
distinguish mere ordinary precedents from those super prece-
dents that, like Superman himself, “came to earth with powers 
and abilities far beyond those of mortal” cases.33 
So there must be something extra these super precedents 
possess that mere mortal precedents do not. While Farber is 
not entirely clear about this, I think two particular qualities 
emerge from his discussion. First, these precedents seem 
deeply embedded in current institutional practice, such that 
overruling them would wreak much social disruption.34 Second, 
no one wants to see them overturned.35 
The fact that precedents are deeply embedded, however, 
only goes to their direct reversal, and does not argue for their 
continued application to new circumstances beyond their im-
mediate application. It is one thing to uphold the Social Secu-
rity system; it is another to create a new entitlement scheme on 
the same constitutional principle. 
Any claim that no one wants to see these precedents over-
turned is of course an exaggeration. If no one wanted them 
overturned, they would never be challenged—and there would 
exist no fearless originalists doing the challenging. Of course, 
the end of much originalist scholarship is to justify rather than 
undercut super precedents such as Brown precisely because no 
one wants them reversed.36 But other super precedents are 
more contested. For these we may say that some people do not 
want them reversed while others do. 
Indeed, the very concept of super precedent has been in-
vented to privilege the claims of the former, who would pre-
serve controversial decisions, against the latter, who would see 
them reversed. Farber and others invoke the concept of super 
precedent on the basis of the rule of law or claim that doing so 
is necessary to avoid chaos, or they find some other criterion to 
 
 33. The Adventures of Superman!, http://superman.ws/fos/thescreen/tv1 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (quoting the opening to the 1950s Superman televi-
sion series). 
 34. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 13, at 1180–81 (describing the impracti-
cality of overruling these precedents and the instability that would result). 
 35. See id. at 1182 (claiming that “[v]irtually everyone” agrees that these 
precedents cannot be overturned). 
 36. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1131–40 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The 
Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 1937 (1995). 
BARNETT_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:08:26 AM 
1240 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1232 
 
avoid having to defend these precedents on their merits. This is 
powerful stuff, and there should be some very strong reason for 
taking the merits of prior constitutional decisions off the table, 
but I find no such compelling arguments in Dan Farber’s 
Essay. 
Nor does Michael Gerhardt’s Essay for this symposium 
provide a credible justification for avoiding the merits of some 
precedents deemed “super.” Instead, like Farber, Gerhardt says 
that: 
[s]uper precedents are those constitutional decisions in which public 
institutions have heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and consistently 
supported over a significant period of time. Super precedents are 
deeply imbedded into our law and lives through the subsequent ac-
tivities of the other branches. Super precedents seep into the public 
consciousness, and become a fixture of the legal framework . . . . Su-
per precedents are the clearest instances in which the institutional 
values promoted by fidelity to precedent—consistency, stability, pre-
dictability, and social reliance—have become irredeemably compel-
ling. Thus, super precedents take on a special status in constitutional 
law as landmark opinions, so encrusted and deeply embedded in con-
stitutional law that they have become practically immune to recon-
sideration and reversal.37 
The rest of his Essay is an attempt to explain how some famous 
Supreme Court decisions qualify as super precedents based on 
one or another aspect of this definition. 
Both Farber and Gerhardt want to claim that super prece-
dents are somehow binding on courts in a way that ordinary 
precedents are not.38 In essence, they are asserting that pre-
 
 37. Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 1205–06 (footnotes omitted). 
 38. In a section replying to this Response and other criticisms of the con-
cept of super precedent, id. at 1221–24, Professor Gerhardt seems not to ap-
preciate fully the nature of his claim as he now characterizes the issue: “Super 
precedent is a construct employed to signify the relatively rare times when it 
makes eminent sense to recognize that the correctness of a decision is a secon-
dary (or far less important) consideration than its permanence.” Id. at 1221. 
But this is just a description of the normal doctrine of stare decisis—that the 
correctness of a decision is secondary to its permanence. Under the normal 
doctrine of stare decisis, however, the Court can reconsider a precedent when 
it decides that the incorrectness of a precedent overrides the various consid-
erations that support stare decisis. Professor Gerhardt admits as much when 
he discusses the gradual erosion of the previously-super precedent of Plessy. 
Id. at 1222 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). For his thesis to have any normative bite, 
he needs to show why some precedents are entitled to more weight—so much 
weight, in fact, that no Court may ever reconsider them no matter how wrong 
they may be—than current notions of stare decisis provide. He needs to show 
why the original meaning of the Constitution can be superceded by judicial 
opinions that change with the times, but certain judicial opinions are fixed 
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sent day courts are to be ruled by the “dead hand” of previous 
courts. They want to claim that the Supreme Court ought not 
to revisit a super precedent from its past, and should adhere to 
the original meaning of the prior decision when it conflicts with 
the original meaning of the text of the Constitution. When it 
comes to these previous decisions of the Supreme Court, these 
scholars reject a “living constitution.” Or perhaps the better 
imagery is that, when it comes to super precedent, the Consti-
tution itself must die so that super precedential decisions may 
live on. 
Such a normative claim would require considerable justifi-
cation, but what both Farber and Gerhardt present is, if any-
thing, a mere statement of fact. And the fact is this: for a vari-
ety of reasons, some previous decisions by the Court are not 
likely to be reversed anytime soon. In Gerhardt’s words, they 
are “so encrusted and deeply embedded in constitutional law 
that they have become practically immune to reconsideration 
and reversal.”39 But who would ever deny the truth of this so-
ciological fact? 
An explanation of why a particular decision will not soon 
be overruled, however—and different explanations are offered 
by Farber and Gerhardt on behalf of different super preceden-
tial decisions—is distinct from an argument for why it ought 
not one day be reversed when the time is ripe. Although I hesi-
tate to claim this about two scholars of whom I think so highly, 
it strikes me that, in their defense of the irreversibility of super 
precedents, both Farber and Gerhardt seem to be committing 
two fundamental fallacies.40 The first is the conflation of the 
 
forevermore. This he still fails to do. Simply reasserting the values that sup-
port “normal” stare decisis, such as they are, is inadequate to support his 
normative argument. Nothing in his reply to this Response addresses the ob-
jections that follow in this Response to his argument for a constitutional doc-
trine super precedent (as distinct from the descriptive claim that some cases 
are very widely accepted). 
What explains the failure even to see the need for a normative argument 
on behalf of “super” as opposed to ordinary precedent? I suspect that both 
Gerhardt and Farber implicitly accept the present-day rejection of a “formal-
ist” commitment to stare decisis, so “precedent” to them means merely a pre-
viously decided case that can be easily reversed whenever we conclude it is 
wrongly decided. They then invoke the traditional formalist rationale for the 
stability provided by stare decisis on behalf of so-called “super precedents,” 
which are actually just “precedents” within the more formalist, traditional ap-
proach to stare decisis. But this is merely speculation on my part. 
 39. Id. at 1206. 
 40. Perhaps this is a product of the phenomenon known as “the normative 
power of the factual.” See Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme 
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“is” with the “ought”; the second is the conflation of the “actual” 
with the “necessary.” Let me consider each fallacy in turn. 
As I have already said, it is a sociological fact that some 
cases are, as a practical matter, irreversible today. Observing 
the existence of this fact, and even explaining why it is so, 
without more, says nothing about whether such a case ought to 
be reversed. To illustrate this, consider the history of racism in 
this country. For well over two hundred years, the existence of 
chattel slavery in America was a sociological fact. There are 
many explanations for why this institution was “so encrusted 
and deeply embedded” that it could not be abolished. Indeed, 
the tragedy of the founding is that, notwithstanding the wide-
spread concession by the founders that slavery was unjust, they 
felt that, as a practical matter, they could do nothing to end it, 
except perhaps put it on some long road to extinction. We all 
know this story. 
Given the practical irreversibility (at the time) of slavery, 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania41 was a super precedent. Was Prigg’s 
reading of the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV inevitable? 
Hardly. Projecting ourselves back then, would anyone alive to-
day reach the same result in Prigg? I think not. But as Robert 
Cover tells the story, the judiciary back then—including even 
some judges who favored abolition—decided that, for a variety 
of reasons, they simply could not get in the way of slavery.42 If 
there was any institution in our history that had insinuated it-
self into every corner of American institutions it was slavery 
and the racism upon which it was based. The institutional and 
economic “reliance” upon the constitutional law that sanctioned 
slavery makes undoing the New Deal seem like child’s play. 
So we got Prigg and Dred Scott.43 Both were super prece-
dents that it took a Civil War and the resulting constitutional 
amendments to reverse. Why amendments? Well, the Court 
was not going to reverse itself. Even after the Civil War, these 
cases were, after all, super precedents. Does their status as su-
per precedents, standing alone, make these decisions norma-
tively right as a matter of constitutional law and theory? The 
undefended normative implication of Farber and Gerhardt’s in-
vocation of the concept of super precedent is that Prigg and  
 
Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1162 (2006). 
 41. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 42. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS 8–30 (1975). 
 43. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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Dred Scott ought not have been reversed by the Supreme 
Court. 
Indeed, it is not entirely clear why, on their argument, 
these super precedents ought to be reversed even by a constitu-
tional amendment. After all, changing these institutions by 
means of constitutional amendment would be just as wrenching 
to the institutions that grew up in reliance on the system of 
slavery and racism as would a judicial overruling. On their 
analysis of super precedent, it should make no difference that a 
super precedent’s reversal comes by means of constitutional 
amendment rather than judicial overruling. By virtue of their 
embeddedness and whatever other qualities render them super 
precedent, they ought not be reversed. Period. 
As a purely descriptive matter, Farber and Gerhardt’s ap-
proach may not be that wide of the mark. Even after the Con-
stitution was formally amended, the Supreme Court refused to 
enforce those amendments according to their original meaning, 
because doing so would yield too radical a change to the exist-
ing institutions. In the Slaughter-House Cases,44 the 5–4 major-
ity’s reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was based almost exclusively on the 
consequences of upholding the original meaning of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, much to the consternation of the 
dissent who denied that consequences determined the meaning 
of the text.45 The racism responsible for Prigg and Dred Scott 
was so encrusted and embedded in practice that the Supreme 
Court was prepared to ignore even a written amendment, de-
signed by radicals in Congress to end the legal infrastructure 
perpetuating the racial subordination of recently emancipated 
blacks. And the same pragmatic considerations that gave us 
Prigg, Dred Scott, and Slaughter-House, gave us the mother of 
all super precedents, Plessy v. Ferguson.46 
Can you imagine the Supreme Court in 1896 acting on its 
own to end or even begin to undermine the apartheid system 
that was Jim Crow, given the national consensus that devel-
 
 44. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 45. See id. at 124 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“The great question is, what is 
the true construction of the amendment? When once we find that, we shall 
find the means of giving it effect. The argument from inconvenience ought not 
to have a very controlling influence in questions of this sort.”). 
 46. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
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oped in the wake of the Compromise of 1877?47 Thanks to Jus-
tice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy48—like the three dis-
senting opinions in Slaughter-House49—we can imagine it. By 
this I mean that we can imagine it. The problem was that the 
majority could not. It took fifty years before the super prece-
dent of Plessy was replaced by Brown v. Board of Education,50 
and as we know all too well, Brown itself did not spell the end 
of Jim Crow. That took decades of political struggle and physi-
cal resistance to accomplish, only after which did Brown itself 
become anything like a “super precedent.” 
That the rightly-despised Prigg, Dred Scott and Plessy 
qualify descriptively as super precedents because of their em-
bedded nature and the social disruption their reversal would 
have engendered is significant. For it reveals that the norma-
tive force of Farber and Gerhardt’s argument rests largely on 
the fact that they, and presumably their readers, approve of the 
cases they have chosen to call “super precedents.” Change the 
subject to cases we all abhor and the challenge is then to find 
pragmatic ways to reverse or limit embedded super precedents, 
rather than perpetuate them. 
The descriptive truth at the heart of Farber and Gerhardt’s 
claim is that, for a variety of reasons, some decisions are not go-
ing to be changed anytime soon. Calling these decisions “super 
precedents” does not add any weight to the argument that 
these decisions ought not to change. Without an additional 
normative reason why any particular super precedent is also 
good, its mere practical irreversibility tells us nothing about 
whether it should be overturned when the situation is ripe. 
To be sure, some precedents could be super, in part, be-
cause they are constitutionally correct. I put Marbury,51 Brown, 
and Griswold52 into this category. But simply identifying these 
cases as super precedents is no substitute for showing why they 
are rightly decided. And such a showing may very well require 
the sort of foundational constitutional theory that Dan Farber 
 
 47. See C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE 
OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1951) 
(“The compromise laid the political foundation for reunion. It established a 
new sectional truce that proved more enduring than any previous one . . . .”). 
 48. See 163 U.S. at 552–65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 49. See 83 U.S. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111–24 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting); id. at 124–30 (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
 50. 347 U.S. 483. 
 51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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considers to be a “misguided quest.”53 Even if he is right about 
foundational constitutional theories, however, the case for con-
tinuing to respect some precedents while discarding others still 
requires some normative constitutional argument besides the 
claim that a particular decision cannot, as a practical matter, 
be reversed overnight. 
What would it take to make an irreversible super prece-
dent like Plessy reversible? Well, what did it take? As already 
noted, the reversal of Plessy required a sustained constitutional 
and political assault, and perhaps also the intervention of a 
world war, the prosecution of Nazi war criminals for genocide, 
and a world-wide ideological struggle against Communism.  
Does the fact that the apartheid system it sanctioned was 
so deeply entrenched in American institutions as to render 
Plessy the mother of all super precedents provide any norma-
tive argument whatsoever for refraining from changing it? Of 
course not. Would the proper way of changing it include argu-
ing how it conflicts with the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and trying to get Justices on the Supreme Court to 
agree? If such a constitutional claim is valid, why not? Cer-
tainly the fact that Plessy was a super precedent would provide 
no valid argument against such an argumentative strategy. 
What then does the fact that the cases cited by Farber and 
Gerhardt are super precedents (if they are) tell us about their 
constitutional correctness? Not a thing. What does their super 
precedent status tell us about whether we should work to 
change them by appointing Justices to the Court who do not ac-
cept them as foundational? Not a thing. Does it even tell us 
whether one day they will be changed? Perhaps, but by no 
means does it guarantee anything about their continued vital-
ity. Plessy is dead. Its death was hastened in Brown by Justices 
who rejected its inevitability, despite the continued presence of 
embedded and encrusted racist social institutions. 
Which brings me to Farber and Gerhardt’s second basic fal-
lacy. They confuse “the actual” with “the necessary.” Assuming 
they have identified cases that, for the variety of reasons they 
discuss, are not actually going to be overruled tomorrow, does 
this entail that these cases were necessarily decided the way 
they were, are necessarily to be preserved, or will necessarily 
survive? Of course not. 
 
 53. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 32. 
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Take the Legal Tender Cases,54 a decision that both Farber 
and Gerhardt think is an obvious candidate for super precedent 
status because they cannot imagine a world without paper 
money issued by the government that is required by law to be 
accepted in payment of debts.55 There is, however, nothing nec-
essary about government-issued fiat money unbacked by spe-
cies. For over one hundred years (1715–1845), while England 
was in the grip of the Bank of England, Scotland got along just 
fine with a system of free banking in which competing banks 
issued their own private notes that the general public could ei-
ther accept or reject in tender of debts.56 As F.A. Hayek argued 
in his book, Denationalisation of Money,57 there is no economic 
imperative for central banks to issue notes that are declared by 
law to be legal tender.58 Indeed, he contended that greater 
monetary stability would be achieved with privately issued cur-
rency.59 With the enormous growth of electronic transfer pay-
ments, we may fast be approaching the day when central banks 
will completely lose control of the money supply in favor of 
competitively-issued financial instruments. 
Now I am not qualified to debate the merits of free com-
petitive banking versus central banking, but I certainly can 
imagine such a system. Both Lawrence White and F.A. Hayek 
are respected economists who contended that it would be supe-
rior to the remnants of central banking with which we live to-
day.60 With this shift in factual assumptions, what now be-
comes of the necessity of maintaining the Legal Tender Cases? 
This precedent does not seem so super anymore precisely be-
cause Farber and Gerhardt offer no constitutional or normative 
argument on its behalf. Their only claim in support of its super 
precedent status is that it is embedded in the current economy 
and that they and others cannot imagine doing without gov-
ernment-issued paper money that was designated as legal ten- 
 
 
 54. Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). 
 55. See Farber, supra note 13, at 1181–82; Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 
1213–14. 
 56. See LAWRENCE H. WHITE, FREE BANKING IN BRITAIN: THEORY, EX-
PERIENCE, AND DEBATE, 1800–1845, at 21–40 (2d ed., rev. and extended, Insti-
tute of Econ. Affairs 1995) (1984). 
 57. F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY (1976). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 78. 
 60. Id. at 99–101; WHITE, supra note 56, at 137–49 (concluding that free 
banking “might perform better” than our system). 
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der. Shift that factual assumption and the argument for super 
precedent, such as it is, collapses. 
One final point. While faint-hearted originalists accept 
some precedents as done deals that cannot and ought not be re-
versed, even fearless originalists do not propose the wholesale 
revolution of reversing all precedents that conflict with original 
meaning overnight. There is nothing about a fearless commit-
ment to uphold the text of the Constitution over inconsistent 
prior decisions of the Court that commits one to rapid, as op-
posed to gradual, change that happens one case at a time. 
Besides, even if they did advocate this, the descriptive 
truth at the heart of the assertion of super precedents would 
make immediate and disruptive change impossible. Exactly 
how would overnight change happen within our system? Would 
the seven full-time nonoriginalist Justices and one faint-
hearted (and part-time) originalist Justice all awaken one 
morning determined to enforce the limits on government power 
provided by the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the Second Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?  
No. In our constitutional system, the only way this sort of 
change would happen is if the President nominates and the 
Senate confirms enough Justices who are explicitly or implicitly 
committed to originalism; the only way that will happen is after 
a political struggle. It is in the nature of the political process by 
which Supreme Court Justices are confirmed that, if this hap-
pens at all, it will happen exceedingly gradually. I suppose we 
can also imagine persuading already sitting nonoriginalist Jus-
tices of the merits of originalism, but no originalist I know—
whether faint-hearted or fearless—pins their hopes on this ever 
happening. 
So then what are we arguing about? The answer is simple: 
Whether this change should happen. Whether this way of in-
terpreting the Constitution is the best. Whether the alternative 
ways of “interpreting” the text—by ignoring just those passages 
that restrict federal and state power—are legitimate. Engaging 
in arguments like these is an essential part of a political proc-
ess by which people are moved to change the status quo. Per-
suading people that the currently embedded constitutional law 
is wrong because it conflicts with the actual Constitution, prop-
erly interpreted, is a necessary step to achieving a change in 
the law, however gradual. 
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In defense of originalism, I have argued that a government 
that lacks the actual unanimous consent of the people is ille-
gitimate unless there are some procedural assurances that its 
nonconsensual commands have not violated the rights retained 
by the people. I have argued further that a written constitution 
is a structural feature whose function is to subject nonconsen-
sual government to a rule of law that limits its powers to ac-
tions that do not violate the rights of the people; that this 
structural feature is destroyed if the very persons on whom 
written constraints are imposed can alter or gut their meaning 
as they desire so as to expand their coercive powers over the 
people; that for these reasons, the meaning of the written Con-
stitution must remain the same until it is properly changed by 
an equally written amendment.61 
Against this argument for originalism, the assertion of the 
existence of so-called super precedent is simply nonresponsive. 
It is, in short, a nonargument. But suppose we grant Farber 
and Gerhardt their normative inference from their descriptive 
claim. Then I posit the existence of a rule of law that precedes 
any of the super precedents they cite—a rule of law that might 
be called “super-duper precedent”: the text of the Constitution 
itself. 
At the heart of the intuition that a particular case is a su-
per precedent is the truism that no one will get confirmed to 
the Supreme Court who denies its binding force. So be it. Now 
let’s see someone get confirmed to the Supreme Court who de-
nies the binding force of the text of the Constitution. Or who 
asserts that the Supreme Court has the power to change, alter, 
amend, or “update” the text; or to replace the text with some-
thing he or she thinks works better; or to “interpret” the text 
into oblivion to meet the needs of changing circumstances. In 
short, let some judicial nominee claim the power to change the 
preexisting meaning of the text without a formal constitutional 
amendment. 
I would like to see what would happen if a judicial nominee 
candidly asserted the theory that lies beneath the concept of 
super precedent—or for that matter candidly asserted any 
nonoriginalist method of interpretation that would elevate the 
precedents of the Supreme Court above the text of the Consti-
tution itself. You won’t see that testimony because the text of 
the Constitution is Kryptonite to super precedents, which is 
 
 61. See BARNETT, supra note 7, at 1–86. 
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why legal academics and judges alike have to keep our written 
Constitution confined to its lead-lined box in the National Ar-
chive. 
CONCLUSION: THE IRONY OF SUPER PRECEDENT 
The fact that two scholars as prominent and insightful as 
Dan Farber and Michael Gerhardt have both advanced the su-
per precedent idea just now suggests that super precedent may 
be in line to supplant “popular constitutionalism” as the consti-
tutional theory du jour. But perhaps both approaches have 
something in common. Both want to take the Constitution 
away from the current sitting Supreme Court. Whereas popular 
constitutionalists want to give the power of interpretation ei-
ther to the legislature (in Mark Tushnet’s version)62 or to “the 
People themselves” (in Larry Kramer’s version),63 Farber and 
Gerhardt both want to give the power of interpretation to past 
Supreme Court Justices. 
Unlike popular constitutionalists, however, Farber and 
Gerhardt are all in favor of being ruled by the “dead hand” of 
the past, provided the hand is that of dead Justices and not the 
founders. Despite this difference, one gets the sneaking suspi-
cion that the common objective of both approaches is to dimin-
ish the discretion of this particular Supreme Court—in particu-
lar its discretion to restore the lost clauses of the Constitution, 
assuming it had any inclination to do so. If it ever did have 
such a notion, the existence of super precedent—at least as cur-
rently defended—provides no reason for it to refrain. 
The concept of super precedent creates one final and deli-
cious irony. If it really has become unthinkable to reverse some 
particular policy for the reasons stressed by Farber and 
Gerhardt, then it would not ultimately matter if the Justices 
ruled on a modern case in a way that would reiterate their sup-
port of the original meaning of the text. The only thing that the 
famous super precedents have accomplished is to mandate or 
forbid governmental policies, and these positions have come to 
be so widely accepted that no one would politically challenge  
 
 
 62. See MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS 33–53, 177–94 (1999). 
 63. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–92 (2004). But see Larry Alexander & 
Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 
(2005) (reviewing and critiquing KRAMER, supra). 
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them, even if they were now free to do so under a corrected in-
terpretation of the Constitution. 
Consider, for example, the case of Bolling v. Sharpe,64 
which held that segregated schools in the District of Columbia 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.65 
Imagine that this case was wrongly decided because the Equal 
Protection Clause (and the Privileges or Immunities Clause) 
applies only to the states and there is no comparable constitu-
tional requirement of racial equality imposed on the federal 
government.66 If this were the case, under a corrected reading 
of the Constitution, the federal government would be free le-
gally to segregate the public schools in the District of Columbia 
(though states would still be barred from doing so). Given the 
embeddedness of the norm against racial segregation, however, 
is it imaginable that any Congress would resegregate the D.C. 
public schools? Not if Farber and Gerhardt are correct in their 
descriptive claim about super precedents. Assuming they are 
right, the only practical consequence of reversing Bolling today 
would be to remove a barrier in current constitutional law to 
federal racial preferences aimed at assisting rather than sub-
ordinating African Americans. 
In other words, while the sociological existence of super 
precedent provides no normative barrier to restoring the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution’s famous lost clauses,67 it 
would severely mitigate any practical harm of doing so. Adopt-
ing the original meaning of the Constitution, therefore, would 
in no way “turn back the clock” on the substantial moral pro-
gress we have made over the past fifty years. And for this eve-
ryone who, like Superman, believes in the “never-ending battle 
 
 64. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 65. Id. at 500. 
 66. I express no opinion on the merits of this claim—which confronts all 
textualists, whether or not they are originalists. See generally David Bern-
stein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1253 (2005) (explaining the problem and defending the correctness of Bolling 
on originalist-textualist grounds). 
 67. The Famous Lost Clauses are the Commerce Clause, Necessary and 
Proper Clause, Second Amendment, Ninth Amendment, and Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Randy E. Barnett, Was 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Mili-
tia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 243–77 (2004) (discussing the original meaning of 
the Second Amendment) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. 
MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)); BARNETT, supra note 7, at 153–334 (dis-
cussing the original meaning of the rest). 
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for Truth, Justice, and the American Way,”68 including original-
ists, should be grateful. 
 
 68. The Adventures of Superman!, supra note 33. 
